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MECHANICS' LIENS RELATIVE TO
OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS - - PART II
By PHILIP G. DUFFORD AND RICHARD R. HELMICK
EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the second in-
stallment of an article which began in the
July-August issue, 34 DICTA 207 (1957)
In the first section of this article, we concluded that a lien claimant
wishing to claim a lien against an oil and gas interest must comply with
the provisions of the specific statute.31 We are now faced with the prob-
lem of interpreting the specific statute. Interpreting this statute brings
us to a discussion of the property and property interests which are sub-
ject to the lien, the parties who may assert it, the details of claiming and
enforcing the lien, and the extent of deficiency liability.
PROPERTY AND PROPERTY INTERESTS SUBJECT TO THE LIEN
It must be said at the outset that it is possible to become so em-
broiled within the language of the statute and the variations of judicial
interpretations relating to such language, that the underlying theory
and purpose of the mechanics' lien can be lost entirely. We believe that
much of the confusion in this field is due to a failure on the part of the
courts to relate the particular statute under interpretation to its purpose.
A sensible interpretation of the statute, in our opinion, requires constant
relation of the statutory language to the basic concepts of a mechanics'
lien. A completely different result can be obtained with ample justifi-
cation from a purely literal interpretation.
We have concluded that the specific statute should be construed to
grant a lien right only against a real property interest. We think that
a careful analysis of the statute and of the holdings of the Poudre River
32
and Terminal 33 cases indicate that this is the intent of the statute. In
taking this position, we are aware that others have concluded differently.
3 4
Nonetheless, even the confirmed advocates of this theory must admit
31 Recall that it was not clear in the general statute whether oil and gas interests
were subject to the lien granted by the general statute; and the specific statute was
enacted, in our opinion, for the purpose of providing a clear basis for the lien against
such interests. Terminal Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549, 550,
557 (1928), views all of the lien statutes-general, the mining section of the general.
and the specific-together and decrees that they are to be applied in pari materia;
and to this is added the mandate from Chain 0' Mines v. Lewison, 100 Colo. 186, 66
P.2d 802 (1935), that the specific statute is intended to broaden the scope of the
mechanic's lien. Our conclusion in the presence of these factors was that in the areas
where the specific statute legislated it was the exclusive remedy, with the qualifica-
tion that it supplemented and did not abridge the remedies provided by the general
lien act.
32 Poudre River Oil Corp. v. Carey, 83 Colo. 419, 266 Pac. 201 (1928).
33 Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549 (1928).
34 Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado 31, 45 (1948). This author consistently takes
the position that personal property is subject to the liens given by the specific stat-
ute, but only in favor of the supplier of the personalty. Particularly illustrative of such
author's position is this statement:
"While this statute gives a lien on personal property (materials, machin-
ery and supplies), this lien is restricted for the benefit of those who furnish
the same. This personal property is not subject to a lien for labor unless and
until it becomes a part of the realty, i.e., a fixture: in which event the inter-
est of a mere contractor in the derrick and drilling rig becomes subject to
the lien of a laborer under a subcontractor under such contractor, in the
absence of notice of nonliability, as well as the interest of a subcontractor of
the lessee in a boiler and engine, even where the boiler and engine has been
leased to the subcontractor by a third party to whom it actually belonged."
Id. at 45.
Recent writers, however, in viewing the statute, have presumed the conclusion we
advance. See Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 95 (1955).
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that the specific statute is not clear on this point and is, therefore,
subject to varying views. The one we advance we naturally feel is that
which yields the most meaningful and orderly results, and is the one
which we feel to be most strongly suggested by our available authority.
It has been stated that the mechanics' lien is a creature of statute
in derogation of the common law.35 This statutory right arises from the
social policy favoring certain creditors, 6 which policy we believe to be
due to the following factors. Where credit is voluntarily extended, secu-
rity can be contracted for by the creditor before he permits the com-
modity to leave his possession, and there is no justification for giving
him any greater right than generally available to creditors under our
economic system. As a practical 'matter, security cannot be readily
obtained for materials or labor furnished upon credit for the improve-
ment or benefit of land, and the fact that the value furnished cannot
be readily reclaimed makes such credit one of the least secure of unse-
cured credit, and ordinarily for a relatively long period of time. Also,
the parties furnishing such benefits, at least as to labor, have tradi-
tionally been those members of our economic society who depend for
their living upon receiving an hour's pay for an hour's work." Accord-
ingly, those who enhance the value of the land by furnishing labor or
materials for the improvement thereof are given a lien against such
land to secure payment of their claims. 38 It is a means of eliminating
the search for assets and earmarking specific property for the payment
of the debt before the creditor parts with the benefit which he can
bestow.39
Although we have concluded that the lien is against real property
only, we hasten to point out that a real property interest often includes
many valuable improvements which are frequently thought of as per-
sonalty. In an effort to avoid confusion in this regard, we introduce into
our discussion the phrases "affixed or installed personalty" and "de-
tached personal property," to distinguish between those items of per-
sonal property which have become absorbed into the well and its appur-
tenances, and those items of personal property which are merely used in
the drilling and operation of the well, but retain their individual identity
and portability. In determining the character of particular personal
property as affixed personalty or detached personal property, we find it
helpful to draw a parallel to the liens available against ordinary build-
ing construction under the general statute. For example, we conclude
that casing in the hole is a part of the improvement and therefore affixed
personalty even though it could be removed.
As a similar instance in general construction, an installed heating
plant could be removed relatively easily by its supplier, but it becomes
a part of the lienable structure when installed-lienable by all of the
lien claimants. 40 Conversely, we conclude that a portable rig is ordi-
narily not lienable, just as hoist equipment installed on the location of a
skyscraper being constructed is temporary and not lienable, regardless
of how securely it may be affixed to the structure during construction.
35 See the first section of our article, 34 DICTA at 214. citing Lane, Mechanics'
Liens in Colorado. 3 (1948).
36 Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 21 (1955).
17 Id. at 21.
38 IV American Law of Property § 16.106F (1952).
39 See Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 10-11 (1955); (and see generally
1 3 of this work).
40 In re Ben Boldt, Jr.. Floral Co., 37 F.2d 499 (10th Cir. 1930).
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In each instance, it is, of course, a factual determination, but not too
difficult since the intent in placing the personalty upon the property
should usually be quite clear.4
Upon this construction, property which does not become an insepa-
rable part of the leasehold estate,4 2 that is, detached personal property,
is not lienable. A condition of the statute is that the labor or material
furnished was so furnished "by virtue of a contract . . . with the owner
or lessee of any interest in real estate .... -41 Where such condition is
41 Lane, supra, note 23 at 36-39.
42 This discussion is concerned principally with the leasehold estate, since that
is the interest commonly available to the lien claimant; but the remarks are equally
applicable to any real property interest detailed in the statute.
43 Because of the need for constant reference to the first section of the specific
statute throughout a consideration of the questions discussed in this article, the first
section is quoted here in full. "Property subject to lien. Every person, firm or cor-
poration, whether as contractor, subcontractor, material man, or laborer, who per-
forms labor upon or furnishes machinery, material, fuel, explosives, power or supplies
for sinking, repairing, altering or operating any gas well, oil well or other well, or
for constructing, repairing, or operating any oil derrick, oil tank, oil pipe line or
water pipe line, pump or pumping station, transportation or communication line, gas-
oline plant and refinery, by virtue of a contract, express or implied, with the owner
or lessee of any interest in real estate, or with the trustee, agent or receiver of any
such owner, part owner or lessee, shall have a lien to secure the payment thereof upon
the properties mentioned, belonging to the party or parties contracting with the lien
claimants, and upon the machinery, materials and supplies so furnished, and upon
any well upon and in which such machinery, materials and supplies shall have been
placed and used, and upon all other wells, buildings and appurtenances, and the
interest, leasehold or otherwise, of such owner, part owner or lessee in the lot or
land upon which said improvements are located, or to which they may be removed,
to the extent of the right, title and interest of the owner, part owner or lessee, at the
time the work was commenced or machinery, materials and supplies were begun to be
furnished by the lien claimant or by the contractor under the original contract; and
such lien shall extend to any subsequently acquired interest of any such owner, part
owner or lessee." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-1 (1953).
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fulfilled, the statute gives the laborer or materialman a "lien to secure
the payment thereof upon the properties mentioned belonging to the
party or parties contracting with the lien claimants ...... Considering
for the moment only these two provisions, if the lien is given against the
properties of the contracting party, and the contracting party must be
the owner or lessee of a real property interest, the inference is that the
lien is given against real property. This inference is fortified by the fact
that the statute uses the phrase "properties mentioned" and although
open to some argument itself, the "properties mentioned" are "any gas
well, oil well, or other well, or ... any oil derrick, oil tank, oil pipeline
or water pipeline, pump or pumping station, transportation or com-
munication line, gasoline plant and refinery," all of which "properties,"
we submit, are affixed or installed personalty and therefore real prop-
erty.
44
If some of the "properties mentioned" are not considered real prop-
erty per se, we believe that they are intended to be restricted to their
character as real property for purposes of the statute because the only
properties which could be in question follow the words "constructing,
repairing, or operating," the import of which to us is a permanency
characteristic of real property improvements. Present day operations do
not even permit the extension of the lien to detached personal property
belonging to the contracting party upon the theory expressed in the
dissenting opinion of the Terminal case. 45 Under present operating pro-
cedure it could not be inferred that the portable drilling rig, no matter
who owns it, is intended to become a part of the well.
46
We believe that the view that the "properties mentioned" are real
property is further supported by the fact that at the time the statute
was written, oil derricks were more permanent installations than they
are now. 47 "Rig" and "derrick" are sometimes used interchangeably,48
the current usage favoring "rig," presumably because of the highly por-
44 This interpretation blocks the possible argument that the statutory language
Is broad enough to grant a lien also against any personal property which might belong
to the same contracting party.
45 84 Colo. 279, 289, 269 Pac. 894, 899 (1928).
46 We do not consider this a departure from the basic statutory interpretation,
however, since in such instances the property in question is not really detached per-
sonal property but has become a part of the real estate interest of the contracting
party.
47 See Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, supra, note 33, at p. 281. 84 Colo. 279, 281, 269
PaC. 894 (1928).




American Founders Building-1330 Leyden Street-P.O. Box 7037, Capitol Hill Station
A Colorado Company Owned by Over 3000 Coloradans
An Old Line Legal Reserve Co. Serving the Insurance
Needs of Colorado
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1957 DICTA
table character of present day units. The word "rig" was used in both
the Poudre River and Terminal cases, but without particular meaning
and with confusion in result. The Poudre decision impliedly considered
the rig detached personal property. The majority opinion in the Termi-
nal case (written by the same Justice who wrote the Poudre opinion)
considered the rig a part of the real estate.49 The dissenting opinion in
the Terminal case considered the "derrick" as an item of portable equip-
ment.
The clauses which follow the basic grant of lien in the statute, com-
mencing with the first "and upon," do not in our opinion expand the
right given to embrace detached personal property, but merely describe
the various real property interests involved, some of which would not
by a strict construction of the statute fall within the phrase "properties
mentioned" as ised in the basic grant of lien. 50 The most tenable argu-
ment against this construction rests in the phrase "and upon the machin-
ery, materials and supplies so furnished," but, as is now apparent from
the foregoing discussion, we construe this language to mean only such
items which have become a part of the real estate and attached per-
sonalty.
Assuming that it is clearly recognized that the statute pertains only
to real property interests, still another problem is present. The Poudre
River case indicates that a lien is available to certain parties against
detached personal property which they have furnished.51 If the Poudre
River case were to stand alone, the language which provides this indi-
cation could be discounted as dictum, but the language was elevated
from this status when the same Justice who wrote the opinion stated in
the Terminal case, "and the lien upon the equipment as such is restricted
to those who furnish it, as is held in Poudre River... " The court's lan-
guage was not necessary to the decision in either case, and we believe
that it was an unfortunate implication which is an error. The dissenting
opinion in the Terminal case clearly takes the position that a lien
49 Though really determining the issue, we think, upon estoppel, emphasizing
the fact that the rig owner had contracted for indemnity against mechanics' liens
with its subcontractor through whom the lien claims arose.
The Terminal decision permitted a lien to be foreclosed against the rig, which did
not belong to the party owning an interest in the real estate, although it should be
noted that the rig owner was a party to the contract with the lien claimant. It is, of
course, proper for a contracting party to be liable for the expense incurred in fulfill-
ment of his contract, but it does not follow that a lien should be available against his
property to secure the payment of such indebtedness, since the mechanic's lien was
traditionally granted against property which benefited from labor or materials in
favor of those persons who furnished the benefit. No benefit was conferred upon the
property of the rig owner, and the dissenting opinion recognized the inequity in
permitting a lien against such property.
50 For example, machinery affixed to the well and the leasehold interest would
appear to be technically excludable from "properties mentioned."
51 The Poudre River case is somewhat anomalous. We have previously expressed
our opinion that it reached a questionable result. (See note 26, supra). The conclusion
that the plaintiff was not entitled to a lien was correct upon the facts obviously as-
sumed by the court; but the reasoning for the conclusion was not in point, and the
facts appear to be different from the basis assumed by the court. The court said,
"One furnishing only labor has not created value in the machinery and equipment
as detached personal property, but only in the well itself and the leasehold interest,
and upon these the statute gives him a lien." We believe that the real basis of the
decision lies in the court's expressed assumption that the properties against which
the lien was claimed were detached personal property; and if this were actually the
case the court's decision would be in full accord with the statutory interpretation to
which we have adhered. However, the actual facts in the case showed that the lien
was claimed against, among other properties, "a rig, rig irons, steel crown blocks.
string of 10" casing in the hole, other casing upon location, drilling line and sand
line." Without concluding whether the rig was affixed or portable under the facts,
the "string of 10" casing in the hole" would not be detached personal property but
instead a part of the well 4tructure, subject to the liens of laborers and materialmen
alike.
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against detached personal property is not contemplated by the specific
statute, and says nothing with reference to an exception in favor of the
party supplying the detached personal property. Practically speaking,
the specific question is not a great problem, except from the standpoint
of procedure, since the vendor of such property can be protected apart
from the specific statute as detailed below.
We have previously noted that the 1929 statute, which is the basis
for the specific statute in its present form, followed closely the determi-
nation of the Poudre River and Terminal cases, and that we consider
this to be more than a coincidence.- We believe that the 1929 Act was
an attempt to approve the dissenting view expressed in the Terminal
case that no lien is available againit detached personal property. We are
not entirely satisfied, however, that the act clearly repudiates the result
implied in Poudre River that a materialman would have a lien against
the detached personal property which he has furnished; but again we
interpret the act in the light of the underlying theory of a mechanics'
lien. The mechanics' lien is non-consensual, 53 and as such should be
limited to those situations where the parties are unable, as a practical
matter, to contract for security. The vendor of detached personal prop-
erty can protect himself by permitting only a qualified or limited title
to pass to the purchaser through the use of a conditional sale contract
or a chattel mortgage;5 4 and even without an express security contract
he may possibly have an inchoate right to reclaim the detached personal
property,-" as witness the tacitly approved action of the defendant
Panuco in the Terminal case. 56 As well, the materialman has a lien
against the real property interests of the contracting party served by
such detached personal property, as discussed in more detail hereinafter,
for the value of such service.
The foregoing considerations of theory relative to the nature of
the property and property interests subject to lien rights under the
statutes must constantly be borne in mind as specific classes of property
and property rights are examined to determine their lienable nature.
These considerations may be summarized as follows:
(a) Both the general and specific statutes contemplate lien rights only
against interests in realty.
(b) Detached or unaffixed personalty cannot be made the subject of a
lien under the statutes regardless of its ownership.
(c) Attached or affixed personalty is subject to liens granted by the
statutes, subject only to prior valid recorded rights.
Confining our analysis to a normal oil and gas well operation and with-
52 See the first section of this article, note 27, supra (34 DICTA at 215).
53 Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 36 §§ 6 and 25 (1955).
54 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-3 (1953). If full title is not permitted to pass
to the purchaser, and notice of such fact is properly recorded before possession is
delivered to the purchaser, the security interest retained as a part of the sale trans-
action should take priority over a mechanic's lien even though the date of inception
of the right to the lien predates the date of recording. See American Law of Property,
§ 16.106H (1952). The "extent of the right, title and interest" of the purchaser would
never exceed his equity under these circumstances.
55 Cf. Rice v. Cassells, 48 Colo. 73, 108 Pac. 1001 (1910); Bethlehem Supply Corp.
v. Wotola Royalty Corp., 140 Tex. 9, 165 S.W.2d 443 (1942). But See Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 121-1-56 (1953).
56 See note 33 supra. The defendant, Panuco Exploration Co., had gone upon the
property and removed the items of machinery which it had supplied and for which
it was unpaid. The court concluded that the property was not subject to a lien since
it was not a part of the oil well for the purposes of the lien statutes. It should be
noted by way of caution that the court was not faced with the problem of determining
the relative rights of the parties as between Panuco and the party to whom it had
sold the machinery.
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out attempting to cover the other types of oil and gas operations de-
scribed in the specific statute, we provide a check list of lienable
property and property interests as follows:
LEASEHOLD INTERESTS
Landowner's Royalty and the Mineral Fee: The Terminal case
should leave little question that the fee mineral estate and the land-
owner's royalty cannot be reached by liens under the general act and
under the predecessor to the specific act. It denies the argument for find-
ing a statutory agency between the landowner and his lessee, holds that
there is no basis in contract, and limits the lien there asserted to the
lessee interests. Further, the present specific act removes the landowner
from any liability except, of course, where he contracts with the lien
claimant.
57
Overriding Royalty Interests; Production Payments: The same rea-
soning which in the Terminal case prohibited attachment of liens to a
landowner's interest should preserve the so-called overriding royalty
interests and also production payments which were created and recorded
prior to the commencement of work operations. These are estates sepa-
rate from that of the working interest owner who contracts for the im-
provements. There is no greater element of agency between the holders
of such interests and the working interest owner than there is between
such owner and the base lessor since these are non-expense-bearing inter-
ests. If on no other basis, they may be preserved on the theory that they
are a prior encumbrance against the leasehold.58
Carried Working Interests and Net Profit Interests: Quite com-
monly the owner of an oil and gas lease may transfer or reserve a given
fraction of his working interest estate on the following basis:
(a) The holder of the working interest residue may agree that he will
pay, for the holder of the fractional part, that portion of the drilling
and completion expenses or that portion of either the drilling or
completion expenses which would otherwise be paid by such holder
for any well drilled on the lease; or
(b) The holder of the residue may agree to "advance" on the part of
the fractional holder the latter's share of either drilling or com-
pleting costs, or both of such costs, and subsequently recover such
expenditure from the fractional holder's share of production.
Such fractional interests are commonly referred to as "carried interests."
Cases from other jurisdictions go both directions in answering the ques-
tion of their susceptibility to mechanics' liens.59 It is arguable that they,
like overriding royalty interests, are encumbrances against the working
interest. The difficulty we see to this position is that the holders of
these estates come dangerously close to standing in an agency relation-
ship with the residue working interest, at least for lien purposes. They
have all of the incidents of control and chargeability of costs attendant
to a consenting working interest, and are distinct only on the basis that
57 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-11 (1953).
58 An excellent case on this point is M. E. Roberts v. Dock Tice. 198 Ark. 397, 129
S.W.2d 258, 122 A.L.R. 1177 (1939), decided under the Arkansas statute, which con-
tains language similar to the Colorado specific act.
59 In Weir v. Janecki Mfg. Co., 254 Ky. 738, 72 S.W.2d 450 (1933) the carried
interest was held immune to the lien, but in Ball v. Red Square Oil and Gas Co., 113
Kan. 763, 216 Pac. 422 (1923) the lien attached to the carried interest. The distinctions
between the Kentucky and Kansas statute are not significant insofar as the question
immediately considered is concerned.
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the holder of the residue has contracted as between the parties to pay or
advance on their behalf their share of costs.
The same reasoning may be applied to a "net profit interest," which
is merely a contractual right on the part of one to take a given percent-
age of the net income that an oil and gas leasehold yields to a lessee.
Here, again, it is arguable that the net profit interest is in the nature of
an encumbrance upon the working interest, but it strikes us as being
an unsegregated portion of such estate, committed in agency by contract
to the working interest for lien purposes and, therefore, subject to liens.
Working Interests: Where the oil and gas lessee's interest or work-
ing interest is held in one person, there is no problem under our statutes
for it can be impressed to its entire extent with the liens given thereby.60
What, however, is the case where this estate is divided by assignment
among several owners? Where a holder of a partial working interest
consents expressly or impliedly to a development or improvement of the
leasehold and commits his interest to the program, we feel his interest,
in its entire extent, is lienable under the terms of the statutes. If he par-
ticipates in the control of the program, he is an owner, part owner, or
lessee, contracting with the lien claimant, as required by the acts. If he
delegates this authority by contract, even while limiting his liability,
he has created an agency or trusteeship; and under the statute his inter-
est is rendered subject to the lien even though he may not be liable
for the deficiency debt.61
Where, however, a holder of a partial working interest is noncon-
senting, there cannot be a contractual basis for a lien, either directly or
by agency, and the lien would fail.
62
If the provisions 63 of the general act which require that a non-
consenting owner post notice of his non-liability following knowledge
of improvements are applicable in pari materia to the specific statute,
a non-consenting working interest holder should protect himself by so
doing.64 In any event, until the question of applicability is clarified this
would be an advisable practice to follow.
A particularly perplexing problem in this area arises with respect
to working interests which are totally or partially "farmed out." Often a
company holding a large area under lease will contract with another
company to drill a test well in the area. Within the industry these con-
tractual arrangements are called farmout contracts. The company own-
ing the lease is normally called a "farmor," and the company which
agrees to drill the well is called the "farmee." The agreements vary in
substance, but generally they provide that if the farmee drills a well to
a given depth at a specified location within a limited time and grants
the farmor access to information obtained during drilling, the farmor
will then convey to the farmee either a divided or an undivided interest
in its leasehold estate or a portion thereof.
A significant fact under this type of contract is that the farmee's
interest is contingent. If the farmee does not perform the required act,
60 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-1 (1953) specifically provides that the lien shall
run to all of the right, title and interest, leasehold or otherwise, of the owner or lessee.
61 See discussion relative to deficiency liability infra.
62 The specific act limits the interests which can be reached to those belonging
to the contracting party or parties. See also J. S. Abercrombie Co. v. Lehulu Oil Co.,
181 La. 644, 160 So. 126 (1935) (decided at a time when the Louisiana statutes re-
quired a contractual basis for the lien; this is no longer required in that state);
Oil Well Supply Co. v. Independent Oil Co.. 219 La. 935, 54 So. 2d 330 (1951).
63 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-3-5 (1953).
64 We doubt that the referred to section of the general act does apply pari materia
to the specific act. See discussion relative to enforcement, infra.
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it does not acquire any interest in the leasehold and title remains abso-
lute in the farmor. Under these circumstances it becomes necessary to
determine whether a lien claimant for work done on the well may reach
the farmor's retained interest in the leasehold (presuming that the
farmee has fully performed his agreement), or whether such claimant
may reach the farmor's leasehold in the event of default by the farmee.
It is unfortunate that the Terminal case did not reveal either in the
decision or in the trial record the terms of the agreement between the
original lessee, Municipal Oil, Inc., and Terminal Drilling Co., for it is
possible that such agreement may have been in the nature of a farmout
contract. In its absence there is no definitive authority in this state other
than the statutes themselves.
The problem becomes one of statutory agency, and in our opinion
agency exists. In the absence of agency between the farmor and farmee
a claimant could reach only the farmee's interest, which is contingent
in its inception and then vested upon the farmee's unilateral perform-
ance. Cases of other jurisdictions reach opposed results as to whether
there is or is not statutory agency between these parties.65
Because they run the gamut of both views and because of similar-
ities between the lien statute there under consideration and our own
specific act, the Brooks and Etheridge cases66 deserve particular note.
The factual narratives in the cases leave little question that a farmout
arrangement existed between the Superior Oil Co., as farmor, and one
McSpadden, as farmee. The United States District Court (Arkansas) in
the Brooks case67 denied a lien against the farmor's interest and limited
the claimant to a right against McSpadden's contingent interest, which,
since there had been a default by him, was virtually no right at all. The
Arkansas Supreme Court then ruled in the Etheridge case68 that McSpad-
den was both "agent" and "contractor" for Superior in the statutory
sense and gave a lien against the leasehold and also apparently against
personalty, both detached and attached. We feel that there are factors
in the Etheridge case which make it misleading authority relative to a
farmor-farmee arrangement. Most significant of these is the fact that the
65 Brooks v. Superior Oil Co. 198 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1952), reversing Brooks v.
Superior Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 641 (D.Ark. 1952); Superior Oil v. Etheriege, 219 Ark.
289, 242 S.W.2d 718, (1951). Also see J. S. Abercrombie Co. v. Lehulu Oil Co., 181 La.
644, 160 So. 126 (1935) (which may have involved farmout estate although court talks
in terms of "sub-lease"); O'Brien v. Greene Production Co., Tex. Civ. App., 151
S.W.2d 900 (1941); Hoffman v. Continental Supply Co., Tex. Civ. App., 120 S.W.2d
851, modified, 135 Tex. 522, 144 S.W.2d 253 (1938).
66 See note 65 supra.
67 96 F. Supp. 641 (D.Ark. 1952).
68 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718 (1951).
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court viewed. Superior's agreement as a "turnkey contract,"6 9 which,
of course, it was not, since Superior had no interest in the well other
than in the technical data it yielded. Also, the Arkansas court laid great
stress on the fact that Superior had prohibited recording of the agree-
ment, which implies an estoppel against Superior to deny agency. In any
event, the Etheridge case became controlling as to Arkansas law and the
United States circuit court was obligated to reverse the district court's
trial decision in the Brooks case.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the ultimate result of these
cases, they are forceful authority in the instant situation and should be
constantly considered by those who advise clients relative to their rights
and liabilities under farmout contracts. It might be helpful from a
farmor's standpoint to specifically refute agency in the contract and to
require recording of the agreement. Perhaps, also, the result of the
Brooks case could be altered by assigning the farmee his interest in the
lease prior to work commencement, subject to disfeasance for failure to
perform. We see no security in any of these suggestions, however, and
submit that the best insurance is in the form of bonding the farmee for
payment of his costs.
Unitized Leaseholds: The specific statute lays the lien right against
enumerated properties including the well upon which the benefit was
conferred, "and upon all other wells .. . and the interest, leasehold, or
otherwise . . ." of the owner, part owner, or lessee, to the extent of his
69 A "turnkey contract" is normally viewed within the oil industry as an agree-
ment between a lease owner and a drilling contractor providing for the drilling of
a well at a fixed price for the owner's account. The significance in this is that the
owner has and retains an ownership interest in the well.
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1957 DICTA
interest. As previously noted, the mining section of the general act pro-
vides that when two or more deposits are worked in common they shall,
for purposes of the act, be presumed to be a single mine.
Today it is a common practice to group separately-owned leases
into a single plan for development through devices of unitization and
pooling. Under the provisions of the acts specified above it can be
asserted that a lien right may be claimed against all lienable property
belonging to a lienable interest holder in the entire unit area for work
performed upon a single well within the area. Cases arising under other
statutes permit such a result.7 0 The claimant must, of course, still satisfy
the requirements of basing his claim in contract and of describing and




Attached Equipment and Machinery: Once casing and other pro-
duction machinery and equipment such as tanks, pumps, pipe, etc., are
affixed, they become lienable under both the specific and general
statute.
7 2
Detached Equipment and Machinery: It is always troublesome to
take a definitive position on questions of law where answers are not
clear, and certainly this category presents such a problem. We have pre-
viously discussed the matter in general terms and specifically affirm our
position here that we do not think that our general and specific statutes,
when properly construed, permit the liens there given to attach to por-
table well drilling and servicing equipment and machinery, nor to well
materials and equipment such as casing, pumps, tanks and fittings deliv-
ered to and stacked at the well site but not consumed in the well or not
affixed thereto.
There are numerous cases, primarily from Louisiana, allowing liens
to attach to detached personalty, principally to drilling equipment.
73
These cases should all be viewed in the light that they arise under spe-
cific oil and gas statutes which differ severely in their language from
our specific statute.
7 4
Produced Oil: There is one special class of personalty that should
70 Oil Field Salvage v. Simon, 140 Tex. 456, 168.S.W.2d 848 (1943). Cases involving
liens asserted under a mining statute are Standard Pipe and Supply Co. v. Red
Rock Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 897, 135 P.2d 659 (1943); Standard Pipe and Supply Co. v.
Marvin, 43 Cal. App. 2d 230, 110 P.2d 476 (1941). On this question careful attention
should be given to the terms of the unit or pooling agreement when the pleadings
for lien foreclosure are drawn. Generally these contracts provide that the leases com-
mitted to the agreement are to be developed as a single and entire leasehold.
71 Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 54 A.LR. 1549 (1928).
The form of lien statement set forth, infra, should carry the entire unit area descrip-
tion in the space provided for a land description.
72 Poudre River Oil Corp. v. Carey, 83 Colo. 419, 266 Pac. 201 (1928) denied a
laborer's lien against casing in the hole, and thereby impliedly held it to be detached
personalty. The question of annexation is in all instances a factual one and the varying
results of our cases make it difficult to set forth any fully definitive guide for its
determination. A general analysis of the question and a summary of different case
results can be found in Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado 36 (1948).
73 Compare Meyer v. Latta, 178 Kan. 316, 285 P.2d 782 (1955); with Given v. Camp-
bell, 127 Kan. 378, 273 Pac. 442 (1929); Idom v. Mass, La. App., 32 So. 2d 411 (1947),
(rig removed before lien attached); Sargent v. Freeman, 204 La. 997, 16 So. 2nd 737
(1944); Odom v. McClanahan, La. App., 196 So. 382 (1940); Smith v. Benson, 262 P.2d
438, 2 Oil and Gas Rep. 1420 (Okla. 1953).
74 Louisiana Laws, Act. No. 68, § 1 (1942) and its successor Act. No. 100, § 1
(1955) direct the lien (privilege) to drilling rigs and machinery attached to or located
on the leasehold. Separate sections for enforcement of the liens (privileges) against
movable and immovable property are provided. Kan. Gen. Stats. § 55-207 (1935) pro-
vides that the lien shall extend to the fixtures and appliances used in operating for
oil and gas purposes. Okla. Stat. Ann. § 144 places the lien upon any "oil well sup-
plies, tools and other articles used in digging."
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be dealt with in detail, and this is produced oil. In the ground oil is
realty75 and is therefore, of course, impressed with the liens arising
under the statutes here considered. Upon notification of the existence
of lien rights, crude oil purchasers will suspend their payments for pro-
duced oil on the theory that it was impressed with the lien right prior
to severance. What then of the oil which was produced and stored or
sold prior to the time that the lien attached? Again there is no fully
definitive authority in this state, but the better view elsewhere, we feel,
holds that upon severance the oil or proceeds therefor are not subject
to the lien on the theory that they are not included within the lienable
properties specified in the statute, which is the case with our statute.7 6
PARTIES WHO MAY ASSERT THE LIEN
Next analyzed are the classes who may assert liens against oil and
gas properties in Colorado. A constant consideration, especially at this
phase, is the statutory necessity that the lien right must be based in con-
tract, express or implied. 7 Under the general statute the lien claimant
must plead and prove that he rendered his benefit at the instance of the
owner or his agent, with those who have charge of construction being
presumed agents. 78 Similarly, under the specific statute the benefit must
be conferred by virtue of a contract express or implied with the owner
or part owner or lessee of any interest in real estate or with the trustee,
agent or receiver of any such owner, part owner, or lessee.
7 9
Laborers: In this general class we include toolpushers, tool dressers,
drillers, roustabouts (in short, all members of a normal drilling crew, ex-
cept watchmen) ,8o carpenters,"' repairmen,
82 truck drivers, 83 "cat men,
8 4
and all other persons whose contribution is one of physical labor.85
75 1 Summers, Oil and Gas, 28 (1954).
76 Garey v. Rufus Lillard Co., 196 Okla. 421, 165 P.2d 344 (1945); Stanolind Crude
Oil Purchasing Co. v. Busey, 185 Okla. 200, 90 P.2d 876 (1939). The statutes of some
states (Arkansas, Louisiana and Wyoming) specifically allow the lien to reach the
produced minerals or their proceeds.
77 Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 54 A.L.R. 1549 (1928).
Interesting cases on this point are Sklar v. Oil Incomes, Inc., 133 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.
1943); Pace v. National Bank of Commerce, 190 Okla. 503, 125 P.2d 178 (1942); and
Lange Cable Tool Drilling Co. v. Barnett Petroleum Corp., 142 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940). See Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado, 67-84 (1948) for collection of
Colorado cases on this point. Also, see Roberts v. Dock Tice, 198 Ark. 397, 129
S.W.2d 258, 122 A.L.R. 1177 (1939). Caveat: Louisiana's specific oil and gas statute
does not now contain a requirement that there be a direct contractual basis
to the lien, Oil Well Supply Co. v. Independent Oil Co., 219 La. 935, 54 So. 2d 330
(1951), and this is most significant in appraising the cases of that jurisdiction. Even
in that state the lien right does not inure to a mere volunteer of services. Willis v.
Mills Tooke Properties, 42 So. 2d 548 (Ia. App. 1949). So it is questionable whether the
requirement for contract is negated entirely in that state.
78 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-3-1 (1953).
79 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-1 (1953).
80 Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549 (1928)
(granted liens to a truck driver, a driller, and a tooldresser). The claimants in Pace
v. National Bank of Commerce. 190 Okla. 503, 125 P.2d 178 (1942) were a pumper and
a roustabout. The lien of a watchman (and scout) was denied in Gleason v. Twin
Cities Drilling Co., 183 So. 67 (La. App. 1938) but on the basis that the services were
not rendered during the drilling cf a well. See also Donaldson v. Orchard Crude Oil
Co., 6 Cal. App. 641, 92 Pac. 1046 (1907); Bell Oil and Refining Co. v. Price, 251 S.W.
559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
S1 Superior Oil v. Etheridge, 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718 (1951) grants a lien for
carpentry and lumber. The case appears correct insofar as it accords a lien to this
type of claimant, but can be criticized insofar as it allows the lien against an oil and
gas "farmor's" retained or reversionary interest.
82 Sargent v. Freeman, 204 La. 997, 16 So. 2d 737 (1944) allows a repairman's
lien, for work done upon unattached personalty, a generator, to run against realty
interests. As we use the term "repairman" here we would confine its meaning to
those who render repair services to installed and affixed machinery.
83 Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549 (1928).
84 An earth moving contractor and operator was denied a lien for roadwork and
backfilling in Willis v. Mills Tooke Properties, 42 So. 2d 548 (La. App. 1949) but on
the basis that the plaintiff had, in effect, volunteered his services.
85 Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929).
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There are, even under the specific statute, some very special prob-
lems attendant to this class of claimant and also to other classes which
should be noted in summary here. In some jurisdictions the phase or
"time" during which the expenditure of labor was made, and also to
some extent the "situs" of expenditure have come to be factors. To illu-
strate this, assume that a bulldozer operator, under a contract with a
lessee or his drilling contractor, performs the following labor items
during three phases of an oil and gas well program:
(a) Prior to the time drilling is commenced the operator cuts out an
access road from the highway to the location and grades and levels
the location.
(b) During the time that the well is drilling the operator cuts reserve
pits and levels an additional parking and storage area.
(c) After drilling he levels the location, "chisels" the roadway and
park area, backfills the pits attendant to abandonment of the well
or else does further excavating for the installation of completion
equipment.
It is possible in the- face of these circumstances to argue that the
operator does not qualify for a lien under the specific statute as to the
work items rendered in phases (a) and (c) because he did not expend
his labor at a time when a well was being sunk, repaired, altered or
operated. Such a contention has been accepted elsewhere."8
so In Willis v. Mills Tooke Properties, 42 So. 2d 548 (La. App. 1949) a lien was
denied because the service was rendered after installation of production equipment
and not during the drilling phase as well as on the ground that the plaintiff's services
were not ordered. The dissent argues that case should turn on the basis that services
were not ordered and implies that there should be a lien for services performed after
drilling. Big Three Welding and Equip. Co. v. Crutcher, 149 Tex. 204, 229 S.W.2d 600
(1949) (denies lien against realty for services rendered to the dismantling of a portion
of a pipeline).
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It is also arguable that the operator, particularly as to his work on
the roadway and removed parking area, did not render his labors at
the "situs" contemplated by the statute; by this we mean that he did not
bestow his benefit upon the well itself.8" These contentions could be
made against any type of labor or contractor claimant or against the
supplier of expendable items rendering benefits during the phases pre-
ceding or following actual drilling, or upon operations not at the actual
drillsite. We do not feel that the statutory language should be so nar-
rowly construed.88 Rather, the decisions of our Supreme Court indicate
that every act essential to the well endeavor is a part of the endeavor
itself and that there is not a terminus of the endeavor until all essential
parts are completed.8 9 Since the drilling of any oil and gas well contem-
plates and necessitates the performance of certain preparatory opera-
tions in the phase prior to actual drilling, and also the performance of
abandonment operations (if the well is dry) or completion operations
(if productive) in the phase following drilling we feel that the better
view extends the terms "drilling and operating" to include expenditures
of services and supplies made during all three phases,90 and also deems
these expenditures as being made "upon or ... for" the well and other
lienable property if they are expended upon operations related and
necessarily incident to the actual drilling of the well.8 1
Surveyors: In our opinion it does not require an unduly broad
construction of the specific statute to hold that the surveyor who stakes
location, lays out access roads, or who defines lease lines and corners,
has performed labor for the "sinking, repairing, altering or operating"
of a well. There is, however, a separate section of the general act 92 which
grants a lien to surveyors and civil and mining engineers who do any
work of surveying or plotting of mineral deposits. Undeniably, this pro-
vision was intended to afford a lien to mine surveyors, but a liberal
construction of its language allows its applicability to oil and gas opera-
tions. By our view, the rights and statutory requirements of this class of
claimant are defined by the specific act.
Technicians: Quite commonly certain technical personal services
are rendered during oil and gas drilling operations, such as those of a
consultant geologist, 3 core analyst, mud analyst, log analyst, and test
engineers.
We think a lien in favor of these persons could be justified under
the wording of the general statute on the basis that they are "engineers"
rendering professional services, but the Colorado cases are not clear;94
87 Willis v. Mills Tooke Properties, 42 So. 2d 548 (La. App. 1949).
88 Cases of other states evidencing a more liberal approach on this question in-
clude Gourley v. Iverson Tool Co., 186 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (plaintiff al-
lowed lien though his work was rendered on well machinery in his shop several miles
from well). Note also Superior Oil v. Etheridge, 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718 (1951);
Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. McDowell, 119 Okla. 77, 249 Pac. 717 (1926).
89 Western Elaterite Roofing Co. v. Fisher, 85 Colo. 5, 273 Pac. 19 (1928); Curtis
v. McCarthy, 53 Colo. 284, 125 Pac. 109 (1912).
90 Like Colorado, the Oklahoma statute does not specifically authorize a lien for
services rendered during abandonment but in Indo Oil Co. v. Bennett, 202 Okla. 300,
213 P.2d 546 (1949) plaintiff was allowed a lien for services rendered during plugging
operations.
91 Labor and materials for a plank roadway to the location formed the basis
for a lien in Superior Oil Co. v. Etheridge, 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718 (1951). In
Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549 (1928), the
court allowed a lien for labor to one whose function was driving a truck to and from
the well.
92 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-3-21 (1953).
93 Lindemann v. Belden Consol. Min. and Mill. Co., 16 Colo AIP. 342, 65 Pac.
403 (1901) (denied lien to geologist).
94 Ibid.
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and such technicians in their own right may not possess lien rights under
the wording of either our specific statute or general statute by the argu-
ment that they do not perform labor or furnish material within the
statutory sense. 95 Their protection may lie only in advance payment of
fees.
Drilling Contractors: By express statement the drilling contractor
has a lien under the specific statute. It is significant that his account will
normally include items not only for labor and services but also for sup-
plies and materials purchased by him and expended upon the well.
It is well to note at this point a problem of general theory which
could occasion difficulty. This is the possible distinction between an
individual claimant and a contractor or subcontractor claimant. We
have stated previously that "cat men," truck drivers, carpenters, and
members of drilling crews have lien rights as "laborers" meaning thereby
that as individuals their contribution is one of labor. Below, segregated
classes of "materialmen" and their correlative lien rights are discussed,
and here again our approach is on an individual basis. The question
then arises as to whether the results reached as to these individual situa-
tions are changed by the fact that they are merged into a contracted
service. We think not. To illustrate this, presume that a drilling con-
tractor agrees to drill a well to the point of setting casing on a "turnkey"
basis, and that pursuant to such agreement he not only furnishes and
pays for all necessary labor and third party services but also he supplies
and pays for all surface pipe, cement, water, fuel, and other materials
and supplies consumed in the drilling. There is some doubt that the
contractor may use as a basis for lien the rental value of his machinery
and equipment; 96 but otherwise his account, at least insofar as it is com-
posed of items for which a lien is given by the statute, forms the basis
for a valid lien with theoretically the same net result as if liens were
filed by the individual laborers and suppliers who expended services or
supplies upon the well. 97 Moreover, we feel that the better view would
give him a lien to the full extent of his account as based upon the con-
tract price. 98
95 This was the argument accepted in Lindemann v. Belden Consol. Min. and
_Jill. Co., 16 Colo. App. 342, 65 Pac. 403 (1901).
96 See Wilkinson v. Pacific Midwest Oil Co., 152 Kan. 712, 107 P.2d 726 (1940);
Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. McDowell, 119 Okla. 77, 249 Pac. 717 (1926).
97 Superior Oil Co. v. Etheridge, 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718 (1951).
98 So holding, but of limited value on this point because they relate to the
general act are Great Western Sugar Co. v. Gilcrest Lumber Co., 25 Colo. App. 1, 136
Pac. 553 (1913); Armour & Co. v. McPhee & McGinnity Co., 85 Colo. 262, 275 Pac. 12
(1929).
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Common Carriers: Even a liberal interpretation of the language of
the specific and general acts does not, in our opinion, justify a lien to
common carriers who transport equipment or supplies to the well, since
they do not perform labor upon or furnish materials to it. Such class
does, however, have a separate statutory lien,9 but only against the per-
sonalty transported.
Fencing Contractors: Tank batteries and other production equip-
ment are often fenced as a protection for and a protection against per-
sons and livestock. To our minds this is a necessary incident to the well,
if not to its "sinking" then to its "operating," and consequently we
would find a lien for those who perform labor or furnish supplies in
this regard.
The various separate classes enumerated above embrace largely the
types who would confer personal services or "labor" to an oil and gas
drilling operation, or who confer both labor and material to such an
operation. It is recognized that there are certain other types of profes-
sional and trades people who would confer indirect benefits to a drilling
operation, such as landmen, lawyers and accountants; but, for the most
part, their rights to non-consensual liens are based upon statutes other
than those which are studied here and affect property and property
interests not significant to this discussion.' 0
Suppliers of Expendable Well Materials: Within this class are those
materialmen who furnish materials which are in a sense "consumed"
during the drilling of a well. The more common types of such supplies
are: water, 101 drilling "mud," fuel,' lumber, cement, explosives, "frac-
ing" and acidizing fluids, chemicals, lost circulation materials, and other
additives. It seems clear that such suppliers have furnished "materials"
to the sinking or operating of the well and therefore have a lien right
under the specific statute.
Suppliers of Drilling Machinery and Parts: Instances have arisen
and will arise where the vendors of portable drilling and servicing
machinery, and parts for the same, attempt to assert liens under statutes
of the type under consideration.' 0' In our opinion, since these claimants
confer their benefit solely upon detached personalty and not upon the
"improvement" for which the statutes give a lien, they should be
denied liens against the lienable properties under the specific statute.'0 1
Suppliers of Well Equipment: Those who supply casing, tubing,
tanks, pumps, pipes, fittings, separators, treaters, and other production
equipment which is installed and affixed to the well and leasehold, have
a lien under our specific statute.
Suppliers of Service Tools: One of the most difficult classes to
appraise is that comprised of those who furnish special tools and equip-
99 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-1-4 (1953).
100 See Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929). It is hoped that nothing
contained in this paragraph misleads brethren of the matron profession to overlook
their attorney's lien rights under Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1-10 et seq. (1953).
101 Although water is one of the basic elements, the same fact which makes Its
haulage necessary in this area, to-wit, its scarcity, makes it a thing of value and
hence it constitutes a material or supply.
102 Fuel is a specifically enumerated supply in the special statute, Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 86-5-1 (1953).
103 See Sklar v. Oil Incomes, Inc., 133 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1943), in which a lien
was denied to a vendor of drilling machinery attempting to assert a lien against
a leasehold interest upon which a well had been drilled by his vendee as an inde-
pendent contractor.
104 The reasoning of Sklar v. Oil Incomes, Inc., supra, note 103, can be applied
to our own specific act on this question.
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ment, often on a contracted basis, which includes operating personnel.
Here we would include bit companies, and those special service houses
that furnish core barrels, reamers, shoes, fishing tools, directional drill-
ing tools, jet perforating equipment, "fracing" equipment, electrical
testing units, and mud logging equipment. Some such suppliers, such as
bit companies, furnish only equipment (usually on a rental basis).
Others, i.e., electric log companies, furnish both equipment and operat-
ing personnel. For the purposes of determining ultimate result, we do
not feel that this difference should be significant because in either case
essentially what is furnished is a benefit conferring service. In one
instance the service is comprised of equipment and in the other it is
comprised of equipment and personnel, but they both equate to a service
which is necessary for the sinking, repairing, altering, or operating of
the well.
While the specific or general statutes do not employ the term"services," still if a service involves the furnishing or rendering, even in
part, of labor, machinery or material (and most do) it appears that a
lien for the service, to the extent of its entire contracted price, should
be allowed. This is by no means a strain of the statutory language, since
the price of "materials" for which a lien is given is composed in large
part of services and profit of the supplier.
Much of the difficulty in this area arises from those cases of other
jurisdictions denying a lien based upon the rental value of equipment. 10 5
We feel that a different rule should prevail in Colorado because the
classes of claimant, at least under the specific act, broadly embrace not
only those who confer a benefit by virtue of furnishing labor and mate-
rial for the purposes of sinking, repairing, altering or operating the well,
but also include those who furnish machinery for such purposes. These
cases are also distinguishable on other grounds.
CLAIMING AND ENFORCING THE LIEN
As a preliminary and necessary step to discussing enforcement of
the lien we should examine briefly the problem of avoiding the lien.
There is no provision in the specific statute under which an owner
or part owner of a lease interest could avoid lien liability, presuming
that the required contractual basis between such person and the claimant
is established expressly or by implication."" In view of this, the only
complete safeguard a contracting owner can obtain is to bond his prime
105See Wilkinson v. Pacific Midwest Oil Co., 152 Kan. 712, 107 P.2d 726 (1940);
Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. McDowell, 119 Okla. 77, 249 Pac. 717 (1926).
106 See discussion, supra, relative to property interests subject to the lien.
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drilling contractor as to performance and as to payment of his obli-
gations incurred for the well. This is a recommended practice from a
great many standpoints, too often ignored in the oil industry when con-
tractors of questionable stability are employed, because bonding costs
are generally passed on to the owner. To our minds, however, the threat
of being obligated to pay twice for a $100,000 well should always out-
weigh the burden of paying a $1,000 bond premium.
Aside from bonding, one could argue that the doctrine of pari
materia announced in the Terminal case could conceivably extend the
contract recording benefits of the general act 1 7 to persons rendered sub-
ject to liens under the specific act. This points up the difficulties which
arise in applying the rule of pari materia, even upon the theory which we
have advanced, where the specific statute is silent and the general statute
speaks. It does not necessarily follow from these circumstances that the
provision in the general statute controls. And, as we indicated in the
first installment of this article, there are conflicts within the specific
statute itself which no form of application of the rule of pari materia
can resolve.
In the event that the recording provisions of the general statute
are applicable, a contracting owner, whose agreement provides for pay-
ment to the contractor in an amount exceeding $500, may record his
agreement and thereafter be protected against lien claimants on the
basis that he shifts to them the responsibility for notifying him of their
claims. He must, of course, then exercise his privilege of withholding
funds. The contract itself must qualify under the statute in that it must
involve a payment in excess of $500, no part of which can be payable in
advance of the time work commences. Installment payments after work
commences, upon the basis of estimated costs, are permissible but at
least 15% of the contract price must be withheld for thirty-five days
following completion of the contract operation. 1°8 We offer this only as
a suggestion, and certainly there is no assurance that future decisions
will permit this protective feature of the general act to apply against
liens asserted under the specific act.
For owners who are in a sense noncontracting or nonconsenting,
such as farmors and the holders of carried working interests (supra),
we feel their protection must lie through bonding the person who con-
tracts for operations. Their lien liability rests, if at all, upon a theory of
implied agency or trusteeship under the statutes; and if this is found,
their property becomes subject to the lien as if they had personally con-
tracted with the claimant. This being the case, there would not be
relief for such persons even if the provisions for giving notice of non-
liability contained in the general act were deemed applicable to the
specific statute. As stated earlier, such provisions if applicable in pari
materia to the specific statute might be employed to protect a non-
consenting working interest owner.
The problems of whether the protective features of the general act
107 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 86-3-1, 86-3-2 (1953).
108 This time period for which the final payment must be held is a graphic example
of the difficulties inherent in applying this portion of the general act pari materia to
the spec-ific act. The thirty-five days specified is designed to embrace the ultimate
date. following completion, that a laborer's lien can be filed under the general act.
Under the specific act he has six months from the last date he furnished labor.
Therefore, for one working during the last days of the well operation and filing his
lien close to the end of his time for filing, the deferment in payment required by the
general act would be of no assistance.
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apply in turn raise the problems which the practitioner faces in attempt-
ing to determine whether notice should be served upon the owner of
the property interest against which the lien is claimed. The specific
statute contains no provision such as the one appearing in the general
statute which permits such notice. The manner in which the 1903 spe-
cific statute was written would have required the conclusion that the
notice provided by the general statute was necessary to give the fullest
protection to the claimant. The present specific statute, however, pro-
vides its own requirements in many respects, and it is not easy to deter-
mine exactly what provisions of the general law "are necessary and con-
venient to the enjoyment of the full benefits of the lien conferred by
the specific statute." 109 The safe approach for the practitioner, of course,
is to serve the notice; however, this is easier said than done in many of
the oil and gas lien situations, since it is not unusual for the owners
of the leasehold to be in absentia upon the determination that a drilling
program has resulted in a dry hole.
Although directing its remarks to the general statute, the Wyoming
court1 has aptly described the purpose in requiring service of notice by
pointing out that the property owner against whose interest the lien is
claimed should be warned against paying the principal contractor while
there are outstanding claims existing in favor of laborers or material-
men.' Since we are dealing in mechanics' liens with a situation where
the property subject to the lien is frequently owned by some party other
than the party owing the debt,"' we think that it is desirable to require
service of notice upon the property owner insofar as possible, where
there is a provision for avoiding liability. This is a matter for future
clarification by the legislature, however, both as to the problem of lien
avoidance through contract recording and as to the permissiveness and
effect of serving notice of the lien. Until so clarified we do not think a
claimant under the specific act should be deemed to have any burden
relative to the service of his lien statement, but in the absence of a judi-
cial determination of the point in Colorado, we think that it would be
advisable for the lien claimant to be in a position to show service or a
bona fide attempt to obtain service of the notice.
Enforcement of the lien granted by the specific statute involves the
filing of a verified statement pertaining to the claim within six months
from the date on which the lien claimant furnished the last item of
material or performed the last service of labor."'
Limitations of space do not permit even a survey approach to the
problems attendant to preparing the lien statement; but in the hope of
meeting some of the questions which are present, we submit the follow-
ing form of lien statement:
109 See the first section of this article, 34 DICTA at 215.
10 We have pointed out our observation that the specific statute closely follows
the language and format of the 1919 Wyoming statute. The Wyoming statute did not
contain any provision for service of notice; and the present Wyoming statute con-
tains such a provision only in connection with a lien against oil runs, this latter
provision being enacted in 1955.
111 Jordan v. Natrona Lumber Co., 52 Wyo. 393, 75 P.2d 378 (1938).
112 Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 22 (1955).
113 Coo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-4 (1953). See the statutory section for the detailed
requirements pertaining to the lien statement.
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NOTICE AND STATEMENT OF LIEN
T o ....................................... .................. .. ......................  .... ........... .. .... ........................................ ,
--------------.-.---------.. - - . . . --.-.-.-.--.-..-, and to all w hom it m ay concern :
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that ..............- ------------- ..................................
(of . . - ..... .. ..... . ............. ), (a C olorado corporation) (a corporation organized and
-existing under the laws of ........ .................... .................................- duly licensed to do business
within the State of Colorado), hereinafter called Claimant, wishing to avail himself
(itself) of all provisions of the statutes in such cases made and provided, does hereby
declare and state that he (it) claims and holds a lien in the amount of $ -----..............................
in accordance with the following statement of lien:
1. That the property to be charged with the lien is all of the right, title and interest,lea seh old or oth erw ise, of _......... ....................................... .........   ......  .....................................I
and of any owners, part owners or lessees in whose behalf
said named persons now act or have acted as agents or trustees, in and to all of
the following described lands:
T.. ............... . .......... , 6th P. M.
S ection ... ..... . ... ... .. .. . ................................
S e c tio n ..... . ... .................................................. ...................................
located in .................. County, Colorado, together with all appurtenances
and improvements thereto and thereon, specifically including but without limitation
the following:
(a) That certain well drilled for oil and gas (or water) described as the
(Belmont No. 1) and located (at and upon the SE 4 NW14SW% of Section
, Township . . , Range . , 6th P. M . . ...........................-- - - .....
County, Colorado) and also any other gas wells, oil wells, or other wells
(oil tanks, oil pipelines, water pipelines, pumps, pumping stations, trans-
portation or communication lines, gasoline plant, refinery and buildings)
located upon the lands described above, and
(b) Any machinery, materials and supplies furnished to the properties de-
scribed in subparagraph (a) including without limitation, -----.................- -- I
...... .... . .. .. . . . ...... .............. .... ...................................................................................... ...  ...... a
(c) Any other appurtenances to or improvements upon the properties de-
scribed in subparagraph (a) above.
'2. The within lien is claimed for and on account of work (and labor, machinery,
material, fuel, explosives, power, supplies) performed upon and furnished by claim-
ant to the sinking (repairing, altering, operating) of the properties described in
1 (a) above by virtue of a contract between claimant and ................................-........... . ........-
--..... . ..  ...... ........................................................  .. .... ------.... . .... . ...  . ... . .. ......... . . ........ . ..-
and those owners and part owners of the property described in Paragraph 1 above
in whose behalf said persons acted as agents or trustees.
'. That the just and true account of the amount due claimant because of the items
performed or furnished as specified in Paragraph 2 above after allowing all credits
is $ .... , together w ith interest thereon at the rate of ........-% for the
period ....... .......... to ....... ..... of $ . ............ .. .. .. . -
B Y -... ---- -. ------ --- ---
(Individual Verification)
;ST A T E O F .................... - ----_ ----------
) ss.
.C ou n ty of ........ .............. ........... .....-- ----- ---- )County of ---------------- . . ...- . .......... , of lawful age, being first duly
sworn upon his oath, deposes and states that he is the claimant above named and that
he has read the foregoing statement and notice of lien and account of indebtedness,
and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true and correct to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief.
Subscribed and sw orn to before m e this . . ------ day of ....................-- ..... ....... , 1957
........... M y co m m iss onex................... . ...... . ........................ .
Notary Public.
(Verification on behalf of corporation)
STATE OF . . ........ .... )
) ss.
C ou n ty of .............................. .......... )
I, ............. .......... , being of law ful age, being first duly sw orn upon m y
oath depose and state:
T h a t I a m . .................................................... o f ----------- . . . .. ..- ... ........... .- -
corporation, the claimant therein named, am authorized to make and do make the
above statement of lien and account of Indebtedness on behalf of said corporation; that
I have read the within statement of lien and account of indebtedness and know the
contents thereof and that the same is true to the best of my knowledge, information
and belief.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ... . day of -------------- .. - - - --.............., 1957
M y com m ission expires .... .. .........- _----_ .............. - .M y c m     . .. . . . . . .... . .. . . . .......... ....... . ............... ....................... .... . .... . .... . .. . . -.. . .............
Notary Public.
Suit on the statement must be commenced in the district court of
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the county in which the statement is filed "not later than" six months
after the date of filing the lien statement.
11 4
We think that no reasonable argument can be made to apply the
different enforcement provisions of the general statute as to time require-
ments for filing and foreclosing, since the specific statute is clear and
unambiguous in its requirements. It is therefore of no importance in
connection with the filing of the statement whether the lien claimant
is a laborer, materialman, subcontractor or contractor; and it is not
necessary to determine the date of completion of the improvements,
all as would be necessary under the general statute.
There is an additional remedy available to the lien claimant where
the property subject to the lien has been removed from location after
the lien has attached without the written consent of the lien claimant.
An inventory of the property so removed can be filed upon certain con-
ditions in the county to which the property has been removed and the
lien is then valid against not only the removed property, but also the
leasehold or other property with which the removed property has been
put in use."' There is a criminal penalty provided against the person
removing the property without proper consent.
Enforcement of the lien entails the often difficult question of
priorities as among various security claimants. The priority questions
stem primarily from the fact that the statute is dealing with real prop-
erty interests which include affixed or installed personal property which
can also be the subject of a personal property security transaction."-
The immediate question of priority between the lien and a chattel
mortgage is quickly disposed of by the statutory provision that the
mechanics' lien will take priority over mortgages which are not "existing
and recorded as provided by law at the time of the inception of the
lien." It is an unrelated priority provision in the statute which gives.
rise to the problem.
The statute provides that "all liens created by virtue of this Article
in any particular case shall be of equal rank and validity, except liens
for labor which shall be preferred." The clear import of all of the statu-
tory provisions 7 appears to require the construction which would estab-
lish the time of inception of the individual liens at the time the indi-
vidual lien claimant first furnished labor or materials; and there is little
room to argue that it is the intent of the statute to adopt the date speci-
fied in the general statute to which all of the general mechanics' liens
relate.
The quoted provision (that all of the liens are of equal rank and
validity) conflicts with this construction to the extent that there could
be intervening mortgage rights. This conflict has been considered none-
existent under a similar situation which developed in connection with
the general mechanics' lien statute of Nebraska. 18 The court concluded
that the Nebraska provision meant that there would be no priority as
114 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-5 (1953).
115 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-6 (1953).
116 Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 95 (1955).
117 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-4(3) (1953). § 86-5-1 includes the language "at
the time the work was commenced, machinery, materials and supplies were begun to,
be furnished by the lien claimant"; but this language must be restricted to a defini-
tion of the interest to which the lien attache& It is possible that the Legislature felt
that this phrase established the time of inception of the lien; but the structure of
the statute makes this phrase unquestionably a part of the description of the specific
interest subject to the lien.
118 See Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. Bond, 37 Neb. 207, 55 N.W. 643 (1893).
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between lien claimants, but the respective interests of the lien claimants
attached only to the property interests available at the time of inception
of their respective liens. The effect of this construction, of course, is to
prefer one lien over another, since those which attached prior to the re-
cording of a mortgage would have first claim against all of the property
interests subject to lien, the mortgagee would be next in line as to his
claim against the specific property mortgaged, and those liens which at-
tached subsequent to the time of recording the mortgage would share in
whatever was left. Although we think the result is just, it is an anomaly
to us to say that all of the liens have equal rank and validity while per-
mitting one lien to be paid in full and another to receive a partial pay-
ment; and this result could obtain under the statute. Further, this con-
struction could result in the payment of materialmen whose liens attached
before the recording of a mortgage in preference to laborers whose liens
attached after such recording, thereby effectively negating the statutory
provision giving priority to liens for labor.
The priority of a valid recorded mortgage on the leasehold or other
interest existing prior to the attachment of any liens under the specific
statute is protected. The provision of the statute limiting the lien "to
the extent of the right, title and interest of the owner . . ." suffices to
recognize the priority of such mortgages; but even without this provi-
sion, it is ordinarily protected by constitutional limitations." 9 We think
that it would be possible under the reasoning of Joralmon v. McPhee'
2 0
for such a mortgage to be given priority over the liens which subse-
quently attach, if the mortgage is given to secure the repayment of a
loan granted for the specific purpose of providing money with which to
drill a well, and notice of such fact is given in the recorded instrument
itself.
A priority question could arise as between a lien claimant whose
lien has followed the property from its original lienable location to a
new location, as discussed above, 12 1 and lien claimants whose liens arose
out of operations at the new location upon which the "removed prop-
erty" has been placed. We believe that the equal rank and validity pro-
vision must be taken to apply to all liens arising as the result of a given
location, and that any such lien which follows the property to a new
location is prior to any new liens granted by the statute.
DEFICIENCY LIABILITY
It is extremely important that the practitioner, in attempting to
determine who is personally liable on his deficiency judgment follow-
ing lien foreclosure, bear in mind that while a given class of lease interest
holders may have a liability to the claimant in the sense that their
interests may be subjected to the claimant's lien, it does not necessarily
follow that such interest holders are personally liable to the claimant for
the debt upon which the lien was based."2
It is for this reason that in prior portions of this article in discuss-
ing situations of agency we have attempted to limit that term by the use
of the Words "statutory agency" so that it applies only to an agency for
119 See Prugh v. Imhoff, 44 Wyo. 143, 9 P.2d 152 (1932).
120 31 Colo. 26, 71 Fac. 419 (1903); see IV American Law of Property 241, § 16.1061
(1952).
121 See note 115 and related text.
122 Kern v, Guiry Bros. Co., 60 Colo. 286, 153 Pac. 87 (1915); Lowrey v. Svard,
8 Colo. App. 357, 46 Pac. 619 (1896); Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado 258 (1948).
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the purpose of affixing lien liability and not for the purpose of render-
ing one liable for a debt through the acts of his agent.
It is our opinion that a personal judgment may not be entered
against an owner of a lease interest unless such owner is personally
liable under the general law of contracts. 123 This conclusion is extremely
significant when it is considered that in most of the instances where a
mechanics' lien is asserted, the well upon which the benefits have been
conferred by the lien claimant is much more likely to have been aban-
doned as a dry hole than to have been completed as a commercial pro-
ducer of oil or gas. This being the case, the likelihood of a deficiency
judgment following lien foreclosure is much more probable than it is in
those cases where mechanics' liens against general building construction
are foreclosed.
There are numerous cases arising out of the Louisiana courts where
a personal judgment is obtained against a lease interest holder even in
the face of the fact that there was no contractual undertaking on the
part of such lease owner to pay a given debt. One should not be misled
by their results, for in Louisiana a statutory provision requiring lease
owners to bond their contractors has the effect of placing the owner in
the position of a bondsman insofar as those persons who deal with the
contractor are concerned. There is no such statutory liability imposed
in Colorado.
The question of personal liability is particularly significant from
the standpoint of those persons who purchase undivided working inter-
ests in a given lease and the attendant fractional interest in the well to
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be drilled thereon. Quite generally, these persons pay a flat considera-
tion for their interest and for their share of drilling and completing a
given well. In doing so they presume that their liability will be limited
to such amount. There are cases where a personal liability was attached
to such persons on the theory that they were members of a mining part-
nership. 24 But certainly the better view, and the one more widely held,
is to the effect that such persons were not members of a mining partner-
ship during the exploratory phase of the oil and gas operation; and this
view prohibits their personal liability on the debt. One of the best state-
ments of this rule is found in Dunbar v. Olson,12' which reads as follows:
"The owner of a so-called working interest in an oil and gas
lease has a duty to share in the expense in proportion to his
interest, which is consistent with his co-tenancy relationship,
but he does not become a mining partner by virtue of this fact.
(Summers, Oil and Gas, Permanent Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 723,
Page 152). Before a mining partnership exists, it must be
shown, not only that there is a joint ownership of the property,
but also a joint working and a joint operation of the lease
involved, which must be shown by competent evidence."'
125
Following this statement, the Illinois court emphasized that the lien
claimant did not rely upon the credit of any one of the owners of the
lease other than the party with whom he contracted and added this very
significant statement relating to the financial structure of oil and gas
ventures:
"Because of the uncertainty of mining operations, few persons
are willing to risk their means at such an undertaking, ...
interests owned by persons differ in amounts as each is able to
furnish means or is willing to take the risks, and . . . these
interests are constantly being assigned and strangers are being
injected into the ownership, so that it would be unjust to sub-
ject each proprietor to personal liability which might sweep
away all his property in an undertaking created against his con-
sent by those who could become members without his knowl-
edge and against his wishes."
' 25b
It is, of course, possible when the facts so warrant to establish personal
liability on the basis that the person against whom the same is asserted
was a member of a mining partnership and as such is liable jointly and
124 Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P.2d 854, 3 Oil and Gas
Rep. 1572 (1954).
125 349 Ill. 308, 110 N.E.2d 664, 2 Oil and Gas Rep. 321 (1953).
125a 110 N.E.2d at 666.
125b Id. at 666-7.
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severally with his co-partners for a debt incurred in behalf of the part-
nership.126 If the necessary elements for a mining partnership are present,
a careful pleader representing a lien claimant will insure collectibility
of his client's debt by pleading this fact in his lien foreclosure suit and
action on the debt.12 On this point, however, it should be remembered
that under most authorities a mining partnership does not exist during
the exploratory phase of an oil and gas venture,128 and also that a mem-
ber of a mining partnership is not liable for the antecedent debts of the
partnership or of his co-partners.129 There are some recent companion
cases130 arising in Utah which appear contrary to these general concepts;
however, a careful examination of these authorities reveals them to be
doubtful.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Limitations of time and space have made it imperative that many
-very significant problems relating to our subject be deleted from con-
sideration here. Also, to facilitate both its reading and writing, we have
confined the article in most phases to well operations. Generally, how-
ever, we do feel that the theories applied here to such operations are
applicable to the other types of oil and gas operations such as pipelines
which are included within the specific statute.
The reader should continually carry an awareness of the lack of
authority existing in Colorado on the questions considered. Cases from
other jurisdictions, of which there are many, should be approached on
a basis of extreme caution because of the distinguishable character of
the statutes upon which they are based. Further, such statutes have
legislative histories and backgrounds as complicated and as confusing
as our own statutes. Because of these circumstances it has been necessary
at many points in the article, in order to be definitive at all, to reach
,conclusions based largely upon our own analysis of the statutes and of
what we feel to be their underlying intent. Time, and our Supreme
Court, will either vindicate or condemn the results so reached.
126 Lyman v. Schwartz, 13 Colo. App. 318, 57 Pac. 735 (1899).
127 In Hendershott v. Dale Leonard Prospecting Co., 298 Mich. 367, 299 N.W. 110
(1941) the complaint alleged a mining partnership and a joint venture. Joint and
several liability was denied, but only because the facts proved that the claimant
had dealt individually with the defendants on the basis that each would be liable
only for his proportionate share of the claimant's debt.
128 Dunbar v. Olson, 349 Il1. 308, 110 N.E.2d 664, 2 Oil and Gas Rep. 321 (1953);
Browne v. Sabine Mach. and Supply Co., 253 S.W.2d 713, 2 Oil and Gas Rep. 268
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Southwestern Leg. Found. 5th Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law
and Taxation, 237-39 (1954); 12 Texas L. Rev. 418 (1934).
129 Elm Oil Co. v. Clark Lumber Co., 179 Okla. 241, 65 P.2d 1221 (1937).
130 See note 124 supra.
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